

Remuneration system for the members of the Management Board  
**Management Board remuneration system**  
**2025**

# WashTec AG

# Remuneration system

# for the members of the

# Management Board

## (Management Board remuneration system 2025)

The remuneration system for the members of the Management Board as resolved by the Supervisory Board of the Company on March 24, 2021 was approved by the Annual General Meeting of WashTec AG ("**WashTec**" or the "**Company**") in accordance with Section 120a (1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) on May 18, 2021. In connection with the routine submission of the remuneration system to the annual general meeting, the Supervisory Board, taking into account the requirements in Section 87a (1) AktG, after detailed examination and consultation and at the recommendation of the Personnel and Nomination Committee, updated and revised the remuneration system and, on March 25, 2025, adopted the following remuneration system for the members of the Management Board (Management Board remuneration system 2025).

In the opinion of the Supervisory Board, the structure and the main components of the previous remuneration system remain appropriate. The existing structure was therefore essentially retained in the Management Board remuneration system 2025 and supplemented with selective adjustments. Alongside editorial revisions and the updating of the information on the long-term variable remuneration with regard to the current Long Term Incentive Program 2024-2026 as part of the remuneration system, the main changes in the revised Management Board remuneration system 2025 are as follows:

With regard to the relative shares of remuneration components within total target remuneration, a slight adjustment has been made to the percentage ranges for the variable remuneration components. The maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG under the previous remuneration system continues to apply in the 2025 remuneration system. Any severance payments on early termination of Management Board office or non-compete compensation payments for any post-contractual non-compete covenant are subject to the provisions set out under heading B.7. In connection with the performance targets for short-term variable remuneration, it is clarified that the sustainability/ESG dimension covers operational or strategic targets relating to environmental, social and/or governance aspects. Furthermore, the provisions have been clarified and supplemented with regard to incidental benefits (in particular contingency-based incidental benefits in connection, for example, with the assumption of office) and to "remuneration-related transactions". The provision on temporary derogations from the remuneration system have been adjusted and supplemented in line with standard market practice.

The Management Board remuneration system 2025 applies to all Management Board contracts whose term commences, or which are entered into or extended, after the Annual General Meeting on May 13, 2025. All Management



Board contracts current at the time of the 2025 Annual General Meeting continue to be subject to the previous remuneration system. The members of the Management Board are each remunerated in accordance with the remuneration system applicable to them.

The Management Board remuneration system 2025 was submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval under Section 120a (1) AktG. The Annual General Meeting 2025 approved the remuneration system on May 13, 2025 with a majority of 77% of the share capital.

## A. Basic features of the remuneration system:

### 1. Contribution to advancing the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the Company

The Company's remuneration system is geared to promoting the corporate strategy and the long-term development of the Company and its affiliates. This is achieved among other things by means of a simple and clear incentive structure in Management Board remuneration. The remuneration system and the uniform remuneration structure for all Management Board functions are designed to prevent inappropriate incentives, both from outside and from within the Company. In particular, it aims to prevent Management Board decision-making that is calculated to maximize remuneration in the short term but is not conducive to the long-term success of the business.

For short-term variable remuneration ("**annual MBO award**"), strategic and/or financial and/or operational targets are selected that are based on corporate or personal performance targets depending on the Management Board position. The Company's long-term development is promoted in particular by supplementing the annual MBO award with an additional variable remuneration component in the form of long-term variable remuneration granted over a three-year assessment basis (Long Term Incentive Program, or **LTIP**). With clear focus on a share price-based performance target in the form of total shareholder return (**TSR**), a further performance target comprising return on capital employed (**ROCE**) and a revenue growth target consisting of the revenue compound annual growth rate (**CAGR**), the LTIP additionally incorporates incentives for long-term decision-making by the Management Board.

Overall, the remuneration system takes into account the challenging responsibilities incumbent on Management Board members for implementing the Group strategy and leading a globally operating company with innovative, digital and flexible solutions in the face of global competition. At the same time, Management Board remuneration is intended to be in line with the market and be competitive so that the Company is able to attract capable and dynamic executive talent. Within specified bounds, the remuneration system is therefore also intended to give the Supervisory Board the latitude to respond flexibly to a changing market and competitive environment. The incentives are intended to be structured in a clear and comprehensible manner, not only for shareholders, but also of course most of all for the members of the Management Board and for employees, whose bonus systems are based on targets.

The new Management Board remuneration system 2025 complies with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act for a clear and understandable remuneration system and, as set out below, follows the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code 2022 other than in those cases where an exception has been declared in the Declaration of Conformity in accordance with Section 161 AktG.

In terms of structure, specific implementation and remuneration levels, the remuneration system meets all of the requirements for modern, competitive remuneration of Management Board members and complies with good corporate governance:

- Highly transparent and easily understood
- Balanced choice of performance indicators
- Clear weighting of individual remuneration components
- Close alignment with business success and corporate performance
- Includes long-term targets
- Incorporates share price performance and growth in shareholder value
- Appropriate and in line with horizontal and vertical benchmarks

## 2. Components of the remuneration system and total target remuneration

Remuneration for the Management Board of WashTec AG consists of fixed and variable remuneration components. The fixed remuneration components comprise the basic annual salary (**fixed remuneration**) and incidental benefits. Performance-based variable remuneration consists of short-term variable remuneration – the management-by-objectives award (**annual MBO award**) and long-term variable remuneration (**LTIP**). In addition, the decision may be made to award an exceptional performance bonus. No retirement provision is granted to members of the Management Board. The remuneration system also provides for customary benefits in connection with the termination of Management Board office.

On the basis of the remuneration system, and within maximum remuneration limits set by the Annual General Meeting, the Supervisory Board determines total target remuneration for each Management Board member, comprising fixed remuneration, incidental benefits and target amounts for the annual MBO award and the LTIP assuming 100% target achievement.

The remuneration system enables the Supervisory Board to take into account the function and responsibilities of each individual Management Board member when setting the total target remuneration. At the Supervisory Board's due discretion, function-specific variation is permissible to take account of criteria such as experience, length of Management Board service and Management Board position. In view of the aforementioned scope for variation, the figures stated for the individual remuneration components as a percentage of total target remuneration are given as a percentage range. The actual percentages therefore vary according to function and as a result of any adjustments made in regular remuneration reviews.

The LTIP provides for a non-personal-investment component and an additional voluntary personal investment component (for details of the LTIP, see under B.2.b.). Excluding the personal investment LTIP component, the fixed remuneration in the remuneration system accounts for around 40% to 50% and the incidental benefits for up to around 5.0% of the total target remuneration. The short-term variable remuneration component accounts for approximately 22%–27% of the total target remuneration for all members of the Management Board. The long-term variable remuneration component accounts for approximately 22%–27% of the total target remuneration for all members of the Management Board. If a Management Board member participates in the personal investment LTIP component, the LTIP proportion can increase to up to around 35%–45% of the total target remuneration. Participation in the personal investment component is optional.

The overweighting of the long-term, multi-year remuneration (**LTIP**) relative to the short-term annual remuneration (**annual MBO award**) aligns the remuneration structure with the sustainable development and long-term growth in the value of the company.

Any exceptional performance bonus granted in individual instances is structured in such a way that the long-term variable remuneration continues to exceed the percentage accounted for by the short-term variable remuneration.

<sup>1</sup>The percentage stated for incidental benefits is that for incidental benefits granted as a rule on the basis of experience from past years. If additional contingency-based incidental benefits such as benefits in connection with the assumption of office are granted in a particular case, the incidental benefits percentage may be correspondingly higher for that particular case. Any such additional benefits must be appropriate; they are also included in – and consequently limited in amount by – the specified maximum remuneration.

### 3. Horizontal and vertical benchmarking of remuneration and employment conditions

The remuneration of Management Board members takes into account the responsibilities of each member of the Management Board, their personal performance and the financial situation, the success and the future prospects of the Company and the Group, taking into account peer group entities and the remuneration structure applicable elsewhere in the Company. Within these bounds, the Supervisory Board ensures that the total target remuneration is in line with the market. For this purpose, the Supervisory Board uses both horizontal and vertical benchmarking.

#### a) Horizontal benchmarking

In order to assess whether the specific total remuneration of Management Board members is appropriate and in line with usual levels compared to other enterprises, the Supervisory Board selects a peer group of third-party entities that is suitable with regard to WashTec's market position (in particular in terms of sector, size and country). The peer group comprises companies that are comparable with WashTec in terms of being listed in the S-DAX index or Frankfurt Stock Exchange Prime Standard, mechanical engineering sector classification, revenue and size of workforce. The benchmarking is applied in relation to both the absolute amount of Management Board remuneration and the development of Management Board remuneration relative to revenue and personnel expenses at peer entities.

#### b) Vertical benchmarking

An in-Company comparison ("**vertical benchmarking**") is also performed. For the purposes of vertical benchmarking, the Supervisory Board looks at the development of Management Board remuneration in a vertical comparison with the remuneration, terms of remuneration and terms of employment of senior management and of the overall workforce of the WashTec Group in Germany. The Supervisory Board looks here at the relationship of Management Board remuneration to the remuneration of the groups referred to, including over time.

For this purpose, the Supervisory Board defines senior management as all employees who (1) hold a management position in Germany and in that capacity report directly to the Management Board or (2) hold an international management position, have a German employment contract and in the capacity of their position report directly to the Management Board. The overall workforce comprises the entire workforce employed by all German companies of the WashTec Group, including senior management.

The Supervisory Board uses vertical benchmarking to determine whether the remuneration differential relative to the workforce is indicative of inappropriate Management Board remuneration. In addition, the Supervisory Board takes care to ensure that the remuneration system for Management Board members is compatible with the remuneration system for non-pay-scale employees. The remuneration of non-pay-scale employees thus also provides for short-term variable remuneration that is tied to Company targets and personal targets.

## B. Detailed description of the remuneration system

### 1. Non-performance-based remuneration components (fixed remuneration)

The non-performance-related remuneration consists of fixed remuneration and ancillary benefits.

- **Fixed remuneration:** The fixed salary is paid retroactively at the end of each month in twelve equal monthly installments with retention of statutory deductions.
- **Incidental benefits:** Members of the Management Board may be granted appropriate and customary incidental benefits in the scope stated under A.2 above, in particular including insurance premiums, company car with private use, reimbursement of expenses and similar benefits in cash and in kind.

WashTec maintains directors and officers (**D&O**) insurance, which includes the members of the Management Board. In accordance with the German Stock Corporation Act (see Section 93 (2) AktG), members of the Management Board are subject to a deductible in connection with this insurance.

With regard to contingency-based incidental benefits, appropriate and customary benefits may be granted in individual instances, in particular in connection with the assumption of office or work-related relocation. When appointing a new member of the Management Board, the Supervisory Board may thus decide that the Company reimburse reasonable, documented work-related relocation expenses incurred by the Management Board member. Also on the appointment of a new member of the Management Board, benefits can be granted to compensate for documented, forfeited benefits from a previous employer, including for outstanding variable remuneration forfeited on transfer to the Company. Contingency-based incidental benefits must always be appropriate. They are included in the maximum remuneration specified under heading B.3. Contingency-based incidental benefits are disclosed separately in the remuneration report, stating the reasons.

### 2. Performance-based variable remuneration components (variable remuneration)

The performance-based variable remuneration components comprise short-term and long-term components tied to the achievement of various targets to be set by the Supervisory Board. The variable remuneration components are calculated in essentially the same way for all members of the Management Board.

#### a) Short-term variable remuneration

The short-term variable annual remuneration is made up on the basis of corporate targets – based on strategic, financial and/or operational targets such as EBIT, free cash flow, Group revenue or another key performance indicator – and individual performance targets for each Management Board position. The individual performance targets for each Management Board position comprise operational or strategic targets, including non-financial targets, primarily from the areas of product innovation, sustainability/ESG, process optimization, digitalization and customer benefit. The sustainability/ESG dimension covers operational or strategic targets relating to environmental, social and/or governance aspects. The specific targets and their respective weightings within the annual MBO award are set by the Supervisory Board in the annual target agreement.

For the short-term variable annual remuneration, an amount corresponding to 100% target achievement (**target amount**) is individually agreed with each Management Board member. The annual bonus may be reduced to as little as 0% of the agreed amount if one or more targets are not met and increased to up to 130% of the agreed target amount if one or more targets are exceeded. The payout amount for short-term variable remuneration is therefore capped at a maximum of 130% of the target amount. If a Management Board member is appointed partway through the year, the short-term variable annual remuneration may be granted in the first year of service pro rata temporis from the time of appointment.

Target achievement for short-term variable remuneration is determined after approval of the consolidated financial statements for the respective financial year and the short-term variable remuneration then falls due for payment in cash together with the next monthly salary payment.

## b) Long-term variable remuneration (LTIP)

In addition to the short-term variable remuneration, long-term variable remuneration is provided for in the form of a Long Term Incentive Program (**LTIP**) with a one-time cash award. The program is structured for a three-year term (**incentive period**). The incentive period for the current LTIP is from January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2026.

The LTIP includes a non-personal-investment component, under which a Management Board member can obtain a maximum cash award, at 100% target achievement, of 100% of their respective short-term variable annual target income for each year of the LTIP.

An additional personal investment component provides a Management Board member with the opportunity to increase – up to a maximum of double (bonus multiplier = 2) – their cash award under the non-personal-investment component by personal investment in WashTec AG shares. Doubling the cash award requires a personal investment in the amount of 100% of the short-term variable target annual remuneration in euros by a specified cut-off date. For the current LTIP, the cut-off date is June 30, 2026. If the personal investment is lower, the personal investment component is proportionately smaller (bonus multiplier < 2). Personal investment for the purposes of the LTIP means (euro) amounts invested in shares in the Company held personally by the Management Board member on the cut-off date. This includes any shares that the Management Board member acquired under previous LTIPs and still holds. Management Board members are only entitled to a cash award for the personal investment component if they continue to hold at least the number of shares invested at the cut-off date through to the end of the incentive period. The LTIP 2024-2026 features performance targets in the form of return on capital employed (**ROCE**) and total shareholder return (**TSR**) and a revenue growth target in the form of the revenue compound annual growth rate (**CAGR**). The performance targets are geared to long-term performance and sustainability under the corporate strategy. Subject to certain requirements and on a case-by-case basis, one-off expense and income items may be neutralized in the calculation of the profit figure relevant to the ROCE target.

The targets must each reach a minimum threshold set by the Supervisory Board in order to count. The Supervisory Board determines the degree of target achievement for each target at the end of the incentive period. If all performance targets are fully met or exceeded, the cash award reaches its maximum amount and 100% is paid out. If target achievement on either target is less than 100% but at least equal to the threshold, proportionately less is paid out for that target for each percentage point below 100%. If target achievement on either target is less than the threshold, there is no payout for the target concerned. If target achievement on all performance targets is not at least equal to the threshold, no cash award is paid.

The ROCE target has a weighting of 40%, the TSR target has a weighting of 20% and the revenue growth target has a weighting of 40% in determination of the cash award under the LTIP 2024-2026.

Payment of the LTIP cash award falls due on the date on which the Supervisory Board adopts the annual financial statements for the final year of the incentive period (**payout date**).

If the Management Board member makes use of the personal investment component, payment is subject to the resolute condition that one-sixth of the gross cash award under the LTIP with personal investment is reinvested in shares in the Company by the Management Board member within three months of the cash award falling due and that the Management Board member remains invested with that quantity of shares for at least three years after

acquiring them. There are exemptions to the reinvestment requirement and the holding period in the event of the Management Board member leaving office.

Under the LTIP 2021-2023 preceding the current LTIP, with an incentive period from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2023, the above-mentioned three-year reinvestment holding period ends in the second quarter of 2027.

The current LTIP 2024-2026 was adopted by resolution of the Supervisory Board on March 4, 2024 and has a term (incentive period) from January 1, 2024 to December 31, 2026. In future LTIPs, the performance targets may be replaced or supplemented with other targets according to the strategic assessment at the time.

### 3. Maximum remuneration

In accordance with Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG, the Supervisory Board has set a maximum amount for the total of all remuneration components for members of the Management Board, including incidental benefits ("**maximum remuneration**").

The maximum theoretical remuneration achievable for a fiscal year within the meaning of Section 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG is €2,000,000.00 for the Chief Executive Officer and €1,500,000.00 for ordinary members of the Management Board. These maximum amounts relate in each case to the total of all payments that could theoretically result from the remuneration arrangements for one fiscal year.

Any severance payments on early termination of Management Board office or non-compete compensation payments for any post-contractual non-compete covenant are not included in the above-mentioned maximum remuneration, but are subject to the provisions set out under heading B.7.

The maximum remuneration as determined for the purposes of the Stock Corporation Act is not the same as the total target remuneration. It merely sets an absolute cap.

### 4. Negative bonus/clawback arrangementg

Negative bonus/clawback arrangements are implemented in the Management Board contracts and the LTIP conditions. The LTIP features a negative bonus/clawback arrangement. Under these arrangements, a serious breach of duty by a Management Board member during the incentive period can result in a total or partial reduction in the LTIP payout amount. Amounts already paid out under the LTIP may be clawed back for up to one year after the end of the incentive period. The Supervisory Board decides on any reduction or clawback at its due discretion. Management Board contracts include a corresponding stipulation for annual MBO awards.

### 5. Concurrent officen

Management Board members do not receive separate remuneration for the assumption of managerial responsibilities at subsidiaries. The assumption of concurrent offices or positions of employment by individual members of the Management Board, including in particular the assumption of Supervisory Board or similar offices, requires the consent of the Supervisory Board. If a member of the Management Board receives remuneration from supervisory board, administrative board, advisory board or similar offices at companies in which the Company holds a direct or indirect interest, that remuneration is deduction from the Management Board member's remuneration entitlement at WashTec AG. Remuneration from supervisory board, administrative board, advisory board or similar offices assumed at other companies is not deducted.

### 6. Exceptional performance bonus

In exceptional cases, the Supervisory Board may at its due discretion decide an exceptional performance bonus for individual or all members of the Management Board. This is decided on a case-by-case basis at the due discretion of



the Supervisory Board, in accordance with the arrangements set out under A.2 above.

## 7. Remuneration-related transactions; arrangements for the event of termination of appointment or of Management Board contract

The regular term of appointment of a member of the Management Board and the contract term of each Management Board contract is normally three years. On reappointment, unless otherwise agreed, the Management Board contract extends for the term of the reappointment. A Management Board contract can provide that revocation of the appointment of a Management Board member for cause in accordance with Section 84 AktG is deemed to terminate the Management Board contract with a corresponding notice period in accordance with Section 622 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch/BGB) without requiring separate notice of termination. A Management Board contract may be terminated at any time without notice for cause in accordance with Section 626 BGB. If a member of the Management Board becomes permanently incapacitated for work during the term of the Management Board contract, the contract terminates at the end of the quarter in which the permanent incapacity for work is established. In the event of a temporary incapacity for work due to illness, accident or other cause for which the member of the Management Board is not at fault, the fixed remuneration continues to be paid for a period of six months or, if earlier, the termination of the Management Board contract.

If a member of the Management Board is appointed or leaves partway through the year, the fixed salary is granted on a monthly basis pro rata temporis.

If the employment relationship does not extend over the entire financial year, the short-term variable remuneration is granted only pro rata temporis. If a Management Board contract is terminated early, the short-term variable remuneration is granted pro rata temporis up to the termination date. In the event of suspension from office, in addition to continued payment of the basic remuneration up to the expiration of the Management Board contract with allowance being made for any remaining leave, the short-term variable remuneration may be granted up pro rata temporis up to the commencement date of the suspension.

Payment of the short-term variable remuneration is made – except in the event of termination of contract due to death or invalidity – at the contractually agreed payout date and on the basis of the originally agreed targets, including in the event of termination of appointment or of the Management Board member's contract before the end of a fiscal year. In the event of termination of a Management Board contract by the Company for cause in accordance with section 626 BGB or of unilateral resignation from office in breach of contract, the Management Board member ceases to be entitled to (pro rata) payment of short-term variable remuneration for the then current fiscal year. Any LTIP cash award entitlement lapses if the Management Board contract terminates before the regular contractual term. The cash award is paid pro rata temporis in the event that the regular term of appointment or of the Management Board contract is completed but termination takes place before the end of the incentive period or in the event of death or permanent incapacity to work due to invalidity. The LTIP cash award is only paid out – except in the event of contract termination due to death or invalidity – at the stipulated payout date after the end of the incentive period and on the basis of the originally agreed targets and comparison parameters.

Any agreed severance payments on early termination of Management Board office other than for cause warranting termination of the Management Board contract may not exceed the remuneration entitlements for the remaining term of the contract and must be limited to a maximum of two years' remuneration (**severance cap**). If a post-contractual non-compete covenant applies, any severance payments will be taken into account in the calculation of the compensation payments. Severance payments are not included in the maximum remuneration specified under heading B.3.

In the event of death of a member of the Management Board during the term of their Management Board contract and the Management Board member is married, is in a registered life partnership under the German Act on Registered Life Partnerships (LPartG) or at the time of death is in an equivalent union within the meaning of section 20 of Book XII of the German Social Code (SGB XII), then their spouse, life partner or equivalent partner is entitled to

receive the fixed annual salary for the month of death and the following six months, or up to the end of the contract term, whichever is earlier. This entitlement is heritable.

A customary post-contractual non-compete covenant can be agreed with members of the Management Board of WashTec AG for a period of two years after termination of the Management Board contract, with an undertaking not to work for any company that is in direct or indirect competition with the Company or a company affiliated with it. Where members of the Management Board are subject to a post-contractual non-compete covenant, they are entitled to remuneration amounting to 50% of the monthly pro rata portion of their fixed annual salary (compensation) for the duration of the non-compete covenant. The non-compete compensation is not included in the maximum remuneration specified under heading B.3.

In addition, a customary non-solicitation of customers covenant may be stipulated for members of the Management Board, for the duration of the post-contractual non-compete covenant, not to directly or indirectly solicit customers of the Company or of affiliated companies; furthermore, a non-solicitation of employees covenant may be stipulated for members of the Management Board, for the duration of the Management Board contract and for a term of twelve months thereafter not to recruit employees of the Company or of affiliated companies. Separate non-compete compensation is not provided for in this connection.

## C. Process for determination, implementation and review of the Management Board remuneration system

The Supervisory Board decides upon a clear and understandable system for Management Board remuneration in accordance with Section 87a AktG and determines the remuneration of the Management Board members in accordance with Section 87 (1) AktG. The Supervisory Board is supported in this by its Personnel and Nomination Committee. Taking into account the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code as amended, the Personnel and Nomination Committee develops recommendations for the system of Management Board remuneration, which are then discussed in detail and adopted by resolution of the Supervisory Board.

The Personnel and Nomination Committee also prepares the regular review of the remuneration system by the Supervisory Board. It regularly reviews the appropriateness and structure of the remuneration system. Where necessary, the Personnel and Nomination Committee submits to the Supervisory Board proposals for modifications, on which the Supervisory Board may then proceed to pass a resolution.

The Supervisory Board may avail itself of the assistance of an outside remuneration consultant. If it does so, care is taken to ensure that the consultant is independent of the Management Board and the Company.

Any conflicts of interest arising for members of the Supervisory Board in connection with the process of determining, implementing and reviewing the remuneration system must be disclosed to the Supervisory Board. How any conflict of interest is dealt with is decided on a case-by-case basis; in particular, it may be decided that the member with a conflict of interest does not participate in related consultations and voting by the Supervisory Board or by the Personnel and Nomination Committee. The Supervisory Board provides information in its report to the Annual General Meeting about any conflicts of interest that have arisen and how they were addressed.

The remuneration system adopted by the Supervisory Board is submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval. If the Annual General Meeting does not approve the remuneration system, a revised remuneration system must be submitted at the next Annual General Meeting at the latest. The remuneration system is resubmitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval at every material change and at least every four years.

## D. Authority to temporarily derogate from the remuneration system

In exceptional cases, in accordance with section 87a (2) sentence 2 AktG, the Supervisory Board may temporarily derogate from the remuneration system if this is necessary to serve the long-term interests of the Company. Procedurally, any such derogation requires a resolution of the Supervisory Board describing in suitable form the duration of the derogation, the derogation as such and the reason for it (meaning why the long-term interests of the Company make the derogation necessary). The components of the remuneration system affected by the derogation and the necessity of the derogation are presented in the applicable remuneration report.

The components of the remuneration system that may be derogated from are the procedure and the provisions on the remuneration structure, type and amount and on the individual remuneration components and parameters (fixed remuneration, incidental benefits, short-term variable remuneration, long-term variable remuneration and exceptional performance bonus; maximum remuneration; relevant remuneration parameters; target remuneration; percentage ranges for target achievement; remuneration components and their relative shares).

Examples of reasons for such derogations include exceptional changes in the economic situation or in the corporate strategy, special requirements in connection with the appointment of Management Board members, or legal requirements.



---

**WashTec AG**

Argonstraße 7 | 86153 Augsburg | Phone: +49 821 5584-5555

Website: <https://ir.washtec.de> | E-Mail: [ir@washtec.com](mailto:ir@washtec.com)

